by GuestfromEU » February 13, 2021, 8:28 am
Guest wrote:hugh3 wrote:From a managerial standpoint, it seems to me that it would be more effective to rather than rely on a single shipkeeper that perhaps two should be assigned to each vessel or at least have one floater that could be rotated from ship to ship to cover any necessary duties while another is away.
If Management Wanted a ship keeper aboard 24/7, all they need to do is hire enough men to cover those hours. It is strictly a cost cutting measure to have only one man aboard each boat..
That's exactly the point I'm trying to make. This falls back on management as they are the only ones that can make the changes necessary to avoid some of the problems associated with the shipkeeper's work load and to provide enough staff to cover any absences. Cost cutting is very important consideration in running any business but it needs to be applied in a logical manner. For example, I once worked for a manufacturing company that had been around for over 50 years. When the new management took over they tried to impress the board of directors by reducing costs. One of the first things cut was all of our janitorial and maintanence positions. In a very short period of time we were having problems keeping our machines running and therefore meeting production demands. Long story short, this began the downfall of the company and within a few years it was closed. Any asset a company has that generates revenue should be maintained and protected against loss.
I also found it somewhat surprising while reviewing the testimony that apparently the St. Clair did not have a central fire alarm system available while the ship was laid (if in fact it did have any such system installed). From what I've read so far it seems as though the crew had to rely upon store bought fire alarms like those for home use. Furthermore, the shipkeeper did not seem to be provided with an adequate supply of batteries to replace those that had gone bad. That too falls back on management.
Considering large commercial ships, the Great Lakes is likely the last area in the world where fixed fire monitoring and fire suppression systems are not fitted on most ships. Residential-grade smoke detectors are used on some ships, but no monitoring exists on others. Compare this to ocean ships built in the 1980's onward which have fire monitoring systems in the main machinery spaces, with display panels showing the fire location on the Bridge and secondary location (often a Fire Control Station). Like ocean ships, the lakers have CO2 fixed fire suppression, but this is a blanket approach, not targeted, and successful deployment would be above the reasonable skill required by a shipkeeper. CO2 also does not cover the tunnel or loop spaces on most ships. The above comments are pertinent to USA-flag ships; possibly Canadian-flag ships are different.
With the USCG and ABS not requiring older ships to be brought up to current rules, there will undoubtedly be a future incident of similar circumstances. Fixed fire monitoring systems which allow remote monitoring do exist. Fixed extinguishing systems for zoned, automatic operation could be installed. The standard sprinkler-type systems have been used on ships laid up in cold weather, since distribution pipes in the machinery space are empty. Shore water can be connected directly to the pump suction. Going further, Hi-Fog systems are attractive due to lack of damage from water if activated. This Hi-Fog option could also be used in the accommodations.
I believe some modifications as explained above were required by Transport Canada for the Algoma Buffalo and Algoma Compass when re-flagged. Could someone confirm what upgrades and modifications were required? Also, ships like the new Interlake build, plus the VTB tugs likely have some form of the above systems installed.
There are engineering solutions for every issue. Of course there is a cost for every step in the process, and without any requirement or incentive to install these upgrades, it becomes difficult to accept these costs. What may be common sense to equipment operators and management may not be so clear to shareholders and the Board of Directors. There is a slim chance the USCG or ABS will ever require any of the above to be installed as both organisations already grandfather in under as-built class rules. Despite glaring oversights and areas for improvement learned from the El Faro incident (including poor ship design but grandfathered in) not much has changed. The USCG has increased PSC inspections and become more diligent, but this focus is mostly directed to foreign-flag ships. With the USA-flag fleet as small as it is, there is an understanding that any onerous requirements instilled by USCG or ABS would be rejected and disputed by shipowners due to cost, time or a combination of both. The only effective means for change would be through P&I attaching conditions to coverage which mandate certain minimum procedures or equipment to be used, otherwise claims would be paid at reduced amounts or not at all, but this also is not common.
[quote="Guest"][quote="hugh3"][quote]From a managerial standpoint, it seems to me that it would be more effective to rather than rely on a single shipkeeper that perhaps two should be assigned to each vessel or at least have one floater that could be rotated from ship to ship to cover any necessary duties while another is away.[/quote]
If Management Wanted a ship keeper aboard 24/7, all they need to do is hire enough men to cover those hours. It is strictly a cost cutting measure to have only one man aboard each boat..[/quote]
That's exactly the point I'm trying to make. This falls back on management as they are the only ones that can make the changes necessary to avoid some of the problems associated with the shipkeeper's work load and to provide enough staff to cover any absences. Cost cutting is very important consideration in running any business but it needs to be applied in a logical manner. For example, I once worked for a manufacturing company that had been around for over 50 years. When the new management took over they tried to impress the board of directors by reducing costs. One of the first things cut was all of our janitorial and maintanence positions. In a very short period of time we were having problems keeping our machines running and therefore meeting production demands. Long story short, this began the downfall of the company and within a few years it was closed. Any asset a company has that generates revenue should be maintained and protected against loss.
I also found it somewhat surprising while reviewing the testimony that apparently the St. Clair did not have a central fire alarm system available while the ship was laid (if in fact it did have any such system installed). From what I've read so far it seems as though the crew had to rely upon store bought fire alarms like those for home use. Furthermore, the shipkeeper did not seem to be provided with an adequate supply of batteries to replace those that had gone bad. That too falls back on management.[/quote]
Considering large commercial ships, the Great Lakes is likely the last area in the world where fixed fire monitoring and fire suppression systems are not fitted on most ships. Residential-grade smoke detectors are used on some ships, but no monitoring exists on others. Compare this to ocean ships built in the 1980's onward which have fire monitoring systems in the main machinery spaces, with display panels showing the fire location on the Bridge and secondary location (often a Fire Control Station). Like ocean ships, the lakers have CO2 fixed fire suppression, but this is a blanket approach, not targeted, and successful deployment would be above the reasonable skill required by a shipkeeper. CO2 also does not cover the tunnel or loop spaces on most ships. The above comments are pertinent to USA-flag ships; possibly Canadian-flag ships are different.
With the USCG and ABS not requiring older ships to be brought up to current rules, there will undoubtedly be a future incident of similar circumstances. Fixed fire monitoring systems which allow remote monitoring do exist. Fixed extinguishing systems for zoned, automatic operation could be installed. The standard sprinkler-type systems have been used on ships laid up in cold weather, since distribution pipes in the machinery space are empty. Shore water can be connected directly to the pump suction. Going further, Hi-Fog systems are attractive due to lack of damage from water if activated. This Hi-Fog option could also be used in the accommodations.
I believe some modifications as explained above were required by Transport Canada for the Algoma Buffalo and Algoma Compass when re-flagged. Could someone confirm what upgrades and modifications were required? Also, ships like the new Interlake build, plus the VTB tugs likely have some form of the above systems installed.
There are engineering solutions for every issue. Of course there is a cost for every step in the process, and without any requirement or incentive to install these upgrades, it becomes difficult to accept these costs. What may be common sense to equipment operators and management may not be so clear to shareholders and the Board of Directors. There is a slim chance the USCG or ABS will ever require any of the above to be installed as both organisations already grandfather in under as-built class rules. Despite glaring oversights and areas for improvement learned from the El Faro incident (including poor ship design but grandfathered in) not much has changed. The USCG has increased PSC inspections and become more diligent, but this focus is mostly directed to foreign-flag ships. With the USA-flag fleet as small as it is, there is an understanding that any onerous requirements instilled by USCG or ABS would be rejected and disputed by shipowners due to cost, time or a combination of both. The only effective means for change would be through P&I attaching conditions to coverage which mandate certain minimum procedures or equipment to be used, otherwise claims would be paid at reduced amounts or not at all, but this also is not common.