Fitzgerald Storm

[Guest]

Starting in 1972, the Charles M. Beeghly (now James L. Oberstar) was instrumented with stress gauges in parts of her hull as part of a study on the phenomena of Springing, and to find whether a combined wave stress (as found in a storm) / springing stress could reach a point to where structural damage would be a concern. It was known that the lengthened lakers were more susceptible to Springing.


The Charles M. Beeghly in 1975 had a capacity of 32,000 tons. After her self-unloader conversion in 1981, cargo capacity dropped to 31,000 tons., while gross registered tons rose from 15,483 tons to 16,285 tons and net registered tons rose from 10,290 to 11,079 tons.

So depending on the self-unloader conversion, a vessel could have a cargo reduction of 1,200 to 1500 tons, while the loadlines remained the same.

- Brian

[Jared]

Jared, looking at what I wrote last evening, I should not have written that second to last paragraph, because it distracts from what I was trying to convey - that is the perception of overloading of ships built in the 1950s due to the change in loadlines. Ships from that era, still load to the increased loadlines that were granted in the early- to mid-1970s and no one claims today that they are sailing overloaded. What is different are the self-unloader conversions of those ships starting in the late-1970s/early 1980s which added additional strength to the hull girder.

- Brian

Are their cargo tonnages the same?

[Guest]

Since the Fitzgerald had a greater freeboard than the Anderson, then how come the later didn't have issues with leaking hatchcovers the Fitzgerald is alleged to have had? With less freeboard, the Anderson would have been more impacted by the large waves that afternoon and evening than the Fitzgerald - yet, except for a damaged starboard lifeboat, no other damage was reported.

Too many factors to give a definite answer. At the end of the day for whatever reason, the Fitzgerald sinks. It could have been her spare propeller blades loose, it could have been poor gasket seals on the hatches. It could have been some combing damage by the unloaders in Toledo, it could have been hatch clamps. Also remember that green seas over the front and into her large glass panes for the lounge could have been a factor in the nosedive.

These debates always ends up in the emotional realm that gets further and further away from the event and devolves into people arguing back and forth. It's all conjecture after a certain point.

We know that she was flooding, we know that she lost her vents, and we know that she had a bad list, and we know she went down 10-15 minutes after 7, and quick enough not to have gotten a call out. The wreck itself tells you the events of ship fall through the water column, not the events leading up to it.

Bad call on both captains to have decided to go downbound when the footers and the Blough went on the hook.

Jared, looking at what I wrote last evening, I should not have written that second to last paragraph, because it distracts from what I was trying to convey - that is the perception of overloading of ships built in the 1950s due to the change in loadlines. Ships from that era, still load to the increased loadlines that were granted in the early- to mid-1970s and no one claims today that they are sailing overloaded. What is different are the self-unloader conversions of those ships starting in the late-1970s/early 1980s which added additional strength to the hull girder.

- Brian

[Scott]

Six Fathom Shoal...enough said

[Jared]

Since the Fitzgerald had a greater freeboard than the Anderson, then how come the later didn't have issues with leaking hatchcovers the Fitzgerald is alleged to have had? With less freeboard, the Anderson would have been more impacted by the large waves that afternoon and evening than the Fitzgerald - yet, except for a damaged starboard lifeboat, no other damage was reported.

Too many factors to give a definite answer. At the end of the day for whatever reason, the Fitzgerald sinks. It could have been her spare propeller blades loose, it could have been poor gasket seals on the hatches. It could have been some combing damage by the unloaders in Toledo, it could have been hatch clamps. Also remember that green seas over the front and into her large glass panes for the lounge could have been a factor in the nosedive.

These debates always ends up in the emotional realm that gets further and further away from the event and devolves into people arguing back and forth. It's all conjecture after a certain point.

We know that she was flooding, we know that she lost her vents, and we know that she had a bad list, and we know she went down 10-15 minutes after 7, and quick enough not to have gotten a call out. The wreck itself tells you the events of ship fall through the water column, not the events leading up to it.

Bad call on both captains to have decided to go downbound when the footers and the Blough went on the hook.

[Guest]

Ships built in the 1950s and 60s were based on strength standards that dated from the 1920s, when the 600 footers were the industry standard. But since the strength standard for that time didn't cover ships longer than 650 feet, it meant designers and marine architects had to extrapolate the strength table curves in order to cover the longer ships being built, i.e. 650+ feet. And since even longer ships were in the planning stages during the 1960s, the then existing strength standard was inadequate for the task.

The US Coast Guard, Department of Transport in Ottawa along with the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) set up a committee to study changes in the strength standard and with that came about the change in load lines. Canada in 1984 accepted the Great Lakes Strength Standard as it was revised, but the US government has seen the Great Lakes Strength Standard as an evolving one, hence the reason why they still call it the Interim Great Lakes Strength Standard.

The Roger Blough and Stewart J. Cort and the ships of the 1970s and later are built under the revised strength standard.

Many ships received a loadline increase starting in the late 1960s and were revised several times into the 1970s as the regulations were changed.

When the Arthur M. Anderson departed Two Harbors on November 9, 1975 she had an aft draft of 25 feet 09 inches, which was below her winter draft of 25 feet 9 inches. Meaning that the Anderson had a freeboard of 10 feet, 11 inches on departure.

The Edmund Fitzgerald departed Superior with an aft draft of 27 feet 06 inches, which was below her allowable winter draft of 27 feet 9 inches. As a result the Fitzgerald has a freeboard of 11 feet 11 inches upon departure from Superior.

Since the Fitzgerald had a greater freeboard than the Anderson, then how come the later didn't have issues with leaking hatchcovers the Fitzgerald is alleged to have had? With less freeboard, the Anderson would have been more impacted by the large waves that afternoon and evening than the Fitzgerald - yet, except for a damaged starboard lifeboat, no other damage was reported.

Those ships that are claimed to be "overloaded" back in the 1970s, still load to the same drafts they were assigned in the early/mid-1970s. Yet no one claims they are "overloaded" today. Is it just perception that ships were overloaded back then?

[Guest]

It has always irritated me how McSorely seems to always receive criticism for being a "heavy weather skipper" and how this is often implied as he took unnecessary risks with his vessel. Shipping has changed quite a bit since the Fitzgerald sinking (primarily due to the decreased demand and increased financial liability factors) and you cannot apply current practices to what was then commonplace within the Great Lakes shipping industry. It further irritates me how it is also overlooked that Jessie Cooper was also right out there with McSorely in this storm and for some reason is never criticized for doing exactly the same thing.

The listing of Soo Locks passages for November 10 & 11, 1975 is very interesting.

Nowadays, the boats are hauling less cargo. 26,000 tons is A LOT. They really overloaded these vessels back then.

You are right, ships today are indeed hauling less cargo but they are also carrying heavier loads with fewer hulls. These ships are designed to carry these loads as was the Fitzgerald designed to carry its rated capacity. In my opinion, however, the increased load lines allowed ships given these increases during the late 1960s to early 1970s to carry more cargo at a deeper draft than originally was intended at the time of construction. This allowed more water to sweep over the deck in addition to possibly exerting extra stresses on the hull. I believe that many did receive some strengthening modifications to permit the deeper drafts but it still goes back to the point that the vessel was being used outside of the original design parameters. I believe that many of the ships built since the 1970s were built with deeper depths to enable deeper drafts if channels were improved. As a result, many have probably never carried their maximum payload capacities even in times of high water levels. I don't believe that vessels were overloaded during the course of normal operation even back in the 1970s, and would likely not have been possible from a Lake Superior port with cargo bound for the lower lakes due to having to pass through the Soo Locks. There have been a few examples of ships found overloaded at the locks in the past, but that really seems to be an exception to the norm.

[Guest]

I think it's important to keep in mind that back in 1975 there were only 25 vessels which were designated by the National Weather Service "co-operating weather observation vessels". The Fitzgerald may have sent in more weather observations to the NWS than other vessels did, hence giving the impression that she always sailed in bad weather. That may or not be so. She was in a big blizzard in January 1975 with record breaking low pressure readings for parts of Minnesota for January, but the Middletown and Ashland were also in the same storm as were other vessels.

Ric Mixter makes a statement that the Edmund Fitzgerald was out in more storms than other vessels. There were 24 other vessels and they may not have been as diligent in sending in weather reports as the Fitzgerald. Some of the reports in the Spring and Summer appear to be due to thunderstorms, which often generate high winds. They would not have gone to anchor for those type of events. So one cannot make a blanket statement that the Edmund Fitzgerald sailed in more storms than other vessels, when you have a sample size of 24 to compare with the Fitzgerald.

It's important to keep in mind that marine weather forecasting and our understanding of the marine environment during the Fall and Winter has come a long, long way since 1975. The National Weather Service relied on on-scene weather observations by mariners out on the lakes to generate a wind and wave forecast. The weather models at that time were very primitive compared to today's models. Surface observations from vessels weren't assimilated into the weather models in 1975 - that didn't start happening until the mid-1980s. Today, vastly increased computational power, along with a greatly increased knowledge of how the atmosphere in the Fall months can cause instability near the lake surface, generating much higher wind and wave heights than would be expected has improved weather forecasts, to the point that since the 1990s, vessels go to anchor when a storm is forecast. The storm of November 10, 1998 was very similar in intensity to the one in 1975, and in that instance, most vessels went to anchor rather than chance the storm.

Here's a simulation of the storm that I've done based on re-analysis data and a numerical weather prediction model I run at home. https://www.goldenhorseshoewx.ca/case_s ... xpress.mp4

The horizontal resolution is 1.33km; in 1975 the weather model for North America used by the NWS only had a resolution of 190.5km! That's how far we've come with computer power and increased knowledge.

- Brian

[MarcE]

It has always irritated me how McSorely seems to always receive criticism for being a "heavy weather skipper" and how this is often implied as he took unnecessary risks with his vessel. Shipping has changed quite a bit since the Fitzgerald sinking (primarily due to the decreased demand and increased financial liability factors) and you cannot apply current practices to what was then commonplace within the Great Lakes shipping industry. It further irritates me how it is also overlooked that Jessie Cooper was also right out there with McSorely in this storm and for some reason is never criticized for doing exactly the same thing.

The listing of Soo Locks passages for November 10 & 11, 1975 is very interesting.

Nowadays, the boats are hauling less cargo. 26,000 tons is A LOT. They really overloaded these vessels back then.

[Guest]

It has always irritated me how McSorely seems to always receive criticism for being a "heavy weather skipper" and how this is often implied as he took unnecessary risks with his vessel. Shipping has changed quite a bit since the Fitzgerald sinking (primarily due to the decreased demand and increased financial liability factors) and you cannot apply current practices to what was then commonplace within the Great Lakes shipping industry. It further irritates me how it is also overlooked that Jessie Cooper was also right out there with McSorely in this storm and for some reason is never criticized for doing exactly the same thing.

The listing of Soo Locks passages for November 10 & 11, 1975 is very interesting.

I apologize, I meant to write Bernie Cooper instead of Jessie Cooper.

[Guest]

It has always irritated me how McSorely seems to always receive criticism for being a "heavy weather skipper" and how this is often implied as he took unnecessary risks with his vessel. Shipping has changed quite a bit since the Fitzgerald sinking (primarily due to the decreased demand and increased financial liability factors) and you cannot apply current practices to what was then commonplace within the Great Lakes shipping industry. It further irritates me how it is also overlooked that Jessie Cooper was also right out there with McSorely in this storm and for some reason is never criticized for doing exactly the same thing.

The listing of Soo Locks passages for November 10 & 11, 1975 is very interesting.

[Guest]

And here's a link to the online archive of the publication: https://archive.org/details/sim_mariner ... 3/mode/2up
Great Lakes coverage starts on page 139 of the publication.

- Brian

Interesting to see that out of the 26 ships outfitted to submit weather reports, 16 submitted the highest wind report of the month on the three lakes the Fitzgerald operated on: Superior, Huron, Erie. Of those 40 reports (some moths had tie records), 10 were from from the Fitz - more than any ship (Dykstra next with 4), which makes me think of Rick Mixter's claim that she was out in heavy seas more often than most other ships. For the monthly record of all the lakes combined, Fitzgerald reported 4 highest of the 13 months (tie in September).

[FWE]

The last " Morning Message" transmission from the Fitz to ON Cleve headquarters via WMI Lorain Nov 10 0720 EST " as follows: Fitzgerald - Superior Piers 0840 Departed 1420/9 Superior Piers 1452 Manitou Island 0530/10 ETA Soo Indefinate Weather Cargo 26116 Require FM Radio service,

[Guest]

Wasn’t the Middletown downbound the locks Monday afternoon?

Middletown passed down through the locks 1030 PM Sunday, November 9th.

[Guest]

Wasn’t the Middletown downbound the locks Monday afternoon?

No, the Middletown was out on Lake Huron on November 10, 1975. At 18 Zulu (1:00pm), she was at 44.5N 83.2W reporting winds of 50knots and waves at 16 feet.

Here's screen-capture from the Mariners Weather Log (1976, issue 3) showing the reports from various Great Lakes ships for November.

And here's a link to the online archive of the publication: https://archive.org/details/sim_mariner ... 3/mode/2up
Great Lakes coverage starts on page 139 of the publication.

- Brian

[Cansail]

Wasn’t the Middletown downbound the locks Monday afternoon?

[Guest]

Fitz sank on a Monday evening. Here are the vessel passage records at the Soo, reported from the Port Huron Times newspaper, for Monday and Tuesday. The paper abbreviated most names. Times converted to military time:

Upbound Monday (Nov 10th)

0100 Fairless
0245 Simcoe

1225 Hilda Majanne
1250 Ava Fors
1310 William Clay Ford
1355 Roesch
1450 Benfri
1500 Murray Bay
1610 Manfri

Upbound Tuesday (Nov 11th)

0455 Charles M White
0535 Patris
0715 L. E. Block
0920 McKellar
1010 Reserve
1030 Dykstra
1115 Thompson
1115 World Virtue
1145 AMoco Indiana

1215 Ayers
1345 Olympic Palm
1345 Hoyt II
1600 Mauthe
1650 Austin
1700 Presque Isle
1720 Polarland
2005 Jackson
2200 Allen

Downbound Monday (Nov 10th)

0230 Humphrey
0415 Goble
0430 Thayer
1020 Ryerson

1200 Weir
1350 John Sherwin
1730 Johnstown
1740 Philip R. Clarke

Downbound Tuesday (Nov 11th)

1305 Arthur M. Anderson
1440 Sykes
1455 Carlo Porr
1540 Blough
1910 Armco
2045 Sterling
2200 Cort
2315 McGiffin

[guest]

i wouldnt call the incan superior down bound travelling between thunder bay and superior. i was on a laker mored in thunder bay, i was having a northern ale at the westfort hotel, felt sorry for those sailors. but for th grace of god go you and i. R.I.P.

[Denny]

To reply to some of Guests posts. First in regards to the Clarke being the last downbound through the Soo Locks that night. Thanks for updating me and others on that as I knew the Clarke was the last downbound as I’ve seen and heard reference to that before. As for the Johnstown being in the Mac Lock. That however I did not know as I’ve never heard that one being mentioned before. In response to the Guest posts about the Hilda Marjanne, you are correct as indeed they left the anchorage only to encounter that the conditions out there were too severe thus they returned to the anchorage later on. Sorry if I posted the wrong information on my posts about them. Finally, indeed I had forgotten about the former CN/RR ferry Incan Superior that night making its run! Captain Richard Metz would often share his Sea Stories here with us and would often recall his memories along with his recollections of that fateful, terrible night that the Fitzgerald sank. Thanks everyione!

[Guest]

Denny
we were the last boat downbound(Clarke)that night. The Johnstown was in the Mac.